Hello everyone. I am Gagan Singh, who will be conducting the two day workshop. These are images from the books I Like to read and I feel, they make up the thinking behind the workshop.

Please do go through them as it will help you prepare better for the workshop. It's 7 photos along with details of the book, the author and page number.


I feel this selection are different ways of looking at Drawing. Whether from the perspective of how people drew, what they drew, or what they saw and what seeing can actually mean.

The geometric line is an invisible thing. It is the track made by the moving point; that is, its product. It is created by movement—specifically through the destruction of the intense self-contained repose of the point. Here, the leap out of the static into the dynamic occurs.

The line is, therefore, the greatest antithesis to the pictorial proto-element—the point. Viewed in the strictest sense, it can be designated as a secondary element.

Love, secure, port came first....

Point and line to Plane, Wassily Kandinsky, Chapter: Line, Pg no: 57,
 Start – "The geometric line is an invisible thing..."




occupied with a yarnwinder which, by virtue of its similarity to a crucifix, is regarded as a symbol of his later death. It seems that Mary wants to draw the Child back from the yarnwinder, and her left hand is placed tenderly round his body, but even Mary can do nothing to prevent the Crucifixion which Christ is destined to suffer: the Child turns away from his mother's loving gaze, and has no contact at all with her right hand, raised in protection, for his entire attention is directed towards the symbol of his future Passion.

Leonardo's work on the Virgin and Child with St Anne and on the Madonna for Florimond Robertet gives the impression that in the early days of the 16th century he was painting with considerable élan. And yet the opposite was the case, because at this time he was mainly occupied with other things such as mathematics and geometry, for instance. Astonished and irritated, Leonardo's contemporaries describe either his unwillingness to paint at all or his immense allowness in completing commissions: the general view was that if there were lobe a competition for the slowest painter Leonardo would win hands down (Beltrami, 143) In the summer of 1502, however, he turned his attention to a completely different sphere of activity and took up a position as military this notorious figure, mainly in Central Italy. He used these journeys to make

Bird's-Eye View of a Landscape, 1502 Pen, ink and watercolour, 33.8 x 48.8 cm (13¾ x 19¾ in.) Windsor Castle

In all likelihood Leonardo made landscape drawings of this kind for Cesare Borgia's military campaigns.

military } leonardo.



Leonardo da Vinci, Basic Art Series, Frank Zollner. Chapter –
 Restless Interlude, pg no: 67, Start – "In the summer of 1502,...."

beautifuly sou'd.

OBJECTIVE THOUGHT


The problem of the body

LEND

Our perception ends in objects, and the object once constituted, appears as the reason for all the experiences of it which we have had or could have. For example, I see the next-door house from a certain angle, but it would be seen differently from the right bank of the Seine, or from the inside, or again from an aeroplane: the house itself is none of these appearances: it is, as Leibnitz said, the geometrized projection of these perspectives and of all possible perspectives, that is, the perspectiveless position from which all can be derived, the house seen from nowhere. But what do these words mean? Is not to see always to see from somewhere? To say that the house itself is seen from nowhere is surely to say that it is invisible! Yet when I say that I see the house with my own eyes, I am saying something that cannot be challenged; I do not mean that my retina and crystalline lens, my eyes as material organs, go into action and cause me to see it; with only myself to consult, I can know nothing about this. I am trying to express in this way a certain manner of approaching the object, the 'gaze' in short, which is as indubitable as my own thought, as

I impossible to doubt

 Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau Ponty, Chapter Part I, The Body, looking at Experience and objective Thought. Pg no: 77, Experience and objective thought – Start – "Our perception ends in objects,..."



We modern, civilized, indoors adults are so accustomed to looking at a page or a picture, or through a window, that we often lose the feeling of being surrounded by the environment, our sense of the ambient array of light. Even when outdoors under the sky, one is apt to be driving an automobile and looking only through the windshield, or traveling in a vehicle where the window to the outside world is constricted to a small angle. We do not look around.

We live boxed-up lives. Our ancestors were always looking around. They surveyed the environment, for they needed to know where they were and what there was in all directions. Children pay attention to their surroundings when allowed to do so. Animals must do so. But we adults spend most of our time looking at instead oflooking around. In order to look around, of course, one must turn one's head.

LOOKING AROUND AND LOOKING AT

The reason why humans must turn their heads in order to look around is that their eyes are set in the front of their heads instead of on either side, as they are in horses or rabbits. The orbits in the human skull are frontal, not lateral. The horse can see most of its surroundings (but not all) without having to turn its head; it can see around fairly well without having to look around. Thus, an enemy can sneak up on a person from behind, sometimes, but the hunter cannot sneak up on a rabbit. It has been suggested that animals who are preyed upon need a more panoramic field of view, whereas predatory animals such as cats can afford to have eyes in the front of the head (Walls, 1942). It has also been argued that the frontal eyes of primates living in the trees afford better "depth perception," but this argument presupposes the entrenched fallacy of depth perception that this book has been at such pains to destroy. Even if depth were perceived, it would be another error to assume that the only kind of depth perception is "binocular," that is, the kind that rests on binocular disparity.

 Gibson, The Ecological approach to Visual Perception, Chapter 12, looking with the head and eyes, pg no: 203, Start – "We modern, civilized, indoors adults..." THE PAINTER "takes his body with him," says Valéry. Indeed we cannot imagine how a *mind* could paint. It is by lending his body to the world that the artist changes the world into paintings. To understand these transubstantiations we must go back to the working, actual body—not the body as a chunk of space or a bundle of functions but that body which is an intertwining of vision and movement.

I have only to see something to know how to reach it and deal with it, even if I do not know how this happens in the nervous machine. My mobile body makes a difference in the visible world, being a part of it; that is why I can steer it through the visible. Conversely, it is just as true that vision is attached to movement. We see only what we look at. What would vision be without eye movement? And how could the movement of the eyes bring things together if the movement were blind? If it were only a reflex? If it did not have its antennae, its clairvoyance? If vision were not prefigured in it?

In principle all my changes of place figure in a corner of my landscape; they are recorded on the map of the visible. Everything I see is in principle within my reach, at least within reach of my sight, and is marked upon the map of the "I can." Each of the two maps is complete. The visible world and the world of my motor projects are each total parts of the same Being.

This extraordinary overlapping, which we never think about sufficiently, forbids us to conceive of vision as an operation of thought that would set up before the mind a picture or a representation of the world, a world of immanence and of ideality. Immersed in the visible by his body, itself visible, the see-er does not appropriate what he sees; he merely approaches it by looking, he opens himself to the world. And on its side, this world of which he is a part is not in itself, or matter. My movement is not a decision made by the mind, an absolute doing which would decree, from the depths of a subjective retreat, some change of place miraculously executed in extended space. It is the natural consequence and the maturation of my vision. I say of a thing that it is moved; but my body moves itself, my movement deploys itself. It is not ignorant of itself; it is not blind for itself; it radiates from a self. . . .

The enigma is that my body simultaneously sees and is seen. That which looks at all things can also look at itself and recognize, in what it sees, the "other side" of its power of looking. It sees itself seeing; it touches itself touching; it is visible and sensitive for itself. It is not a self through transparence, like thought, which only thinks its object by

 Merleau Ponty on Paul Cezanne in The Primacy of Perception, Chapter 5, Eye and Mind, Pg no: 162, Start – "I have only to see something to know..."

due he gie transme

17 Coiling over

Recall that for Merleau-Ponty, the essence of perception lies in the alternation of inspiration and expiration, of action and passion. To be sentient, in his view, is to open up to a world, to yield to its embrace, and to resonate in one's inner being to its illuminations and reverberations. It is because we can see that we experience light, because we can hear that we experience sound, and because we can touch that we experience feeling. Bathed in light, submerged in sound and rapt in feeling, the sentient being rides the crest of the world's becoming, ever-present and witness to that moment when the world is about to disclose itself for what it is. 1 Thus in a sentient world there are no objects and subjects of perception; rather, perception inheres in the creative movement of emergence, where 'things become things', as Merleau-Ponty put it, and 'the world becomes world'.2 To perceive things, then, is simultaneously to be perceived by them: to see is to be seen, to hear is to be heard, and so on. This reversibility, most obvious in the exemplary instance of two hands touching, was, in Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology, fundamental to all perception.

Yet surely not everything in the world, taken in itself, is sentient. Glaciers are not in themselves sentient, nor are trees, nor stones. How can the alleged reversibility of perception hold in a situation where a human, who is selfsensing, encounters a thing - such as a glacier, rock or tree - which is not? What about trees, for example? In conversation with Georges Charbonnier, the painter André Marchand observed that in a forest, he had often felt that it was not he who was looking at the trees. 'On some days', Marchand said, 'I felt it was the trees that were looking at me.'3 This is, no doubt, an experience familiar to anyone who has walked in the woods, especially in the half-light of dawn or dusk. As for Merleau-Ponty, citing Marchand's observations with approval, it only goes to prove the point. 'Inevitably', he says of the painter, 'the roles between him and the visible are reversed.'4 The painter sees the trees; the trees see the painter. This is not because trees have eyes, as archaeologist Christopher Tilley explains, referring in his work on landscape phenomenology to Merleau-Ponty's observations on this score. It is rather 'because the trees affect, move the painter, become part of the painting that would be impossible without their presence'.5

Tim Ingold, The life of Lines, Chapter 17 Coiling Over, Pg no: 84,
 Start – "Recall that for Merleau-Ponty, the essence...."